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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Judgment and Order of Commitment to the 
Utah State Prison were signed by the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson on November 
8th, 2001 and entered by the Clerk of the Court on November 9th' 2001. See also 
Section 78-2A-3(e) Utah Code Annotated, conferring jurisdiction on this Court. 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on November 15th, 2001, within 30 days of 
the entry of judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, this appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are as follows: 
I. Did the trial court err in allowing excessive courtroom security 
including allowing Fernandez to be shackled? 
This issue is reviewed with close scrutiny to assess whether the 
shackles were the intrusive security measure necessary. Cf Williams v. 
Estelle, 435 U.S. 501, 504-5 (1976) (courts should review inherently 
prejudicial trial circumstances such as prison garb on the Defendant with 
close scrutiny.); State v. Gardner, 789 P 2d 273, 281 (Utah 1989), affirming 
presence of security personnel as the least intrusive means of providing 
security, cert denied 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). 
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II. Did the trial court err in denying the for-cause challenges of 
potential jurors? 
In reviewing the trial courts granting or denial of challenges for 
cause to prospective jurors, the Court reviews for abuse of discretion. See 
e.g., State v. Bishop, 753 P 2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Menzies, 889 P. 2d 393 (Utah), cert denied 513 U.S. 1115 
(1995). 
IIL Did the trial court err in denying the motions for mistrial stemming 
from the introduction of evidence concerning Fernandez's status as a 
lock-down inmate contrary to a ruling in limine to exclude? 
This issue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Widdson, 28 P. 3d 1278, 1290 (Utah 2001); State v. De Corso, 993 
P. 2d 837, (Utah 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1164. 
IV. Did the trial court err in refusing to order a presentence report and in 
Fernandez to serve consecutive prison terms? 
The standard of review for sentencing decisions is an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Galli, 967 P. 2d 930 (Utah 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah provides, in relevant part, 
that: 
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In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel...to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him... and the right to appeal in all cases...The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. 
Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States provides, in 
relevant part, that: 
No State shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of law. 
Utah Code Section 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part, that: 
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent 
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant 
shall be acquitted. 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are determinative of 
this appeal and are set forth in the addendum to this brief: Utah Code Section 64-13-20, 
Utah Code Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Section 76-8-418, Utah Rules of Evidence 401, 
402,403, and 404. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Mr. Fernandez case parallels that of his co-defendant Joseph Madsen, with 
the exception that Mr. Madsen has an additional charge and conviction for Class B 
Misdemeanor theft. Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Madsen were charged at the same 
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time and had their preliminary hearing and trial together. Mr. Madsen has a 
companion appeal # 2001092-CA. 
Mr. Fernandez appeals from his conviction following a jury trial of Damage 
of a Jail, a Third Degree Felony in violation of Section 76-8-418 U.C.A. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
Mr. Fernandez was charged in a one count Information with the above 
charge. (R-3). He was bound over after a preliminary hearing on October 15th, 
2001. A consolidated jury trial with co-defendant Madsen was held on October 
31st, 2001. 
Fernandez was convicted. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW. 
Sentencing was on November 5th, 2001. Defendant was sentenced to a term 
in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years. His sentence is to run 
consecutively with the sentence he is already serving. (See Judgment and Order of 
Commitment-Appendix). 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Mr. Fernandez and Mr. Madsen were inmates in the San Juan County Jail 
on September 17th, 2001 (TR-82) (References designated "TR-" refer to the page 
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number of Volume I of the official court transcript of the case.) At the beginning 
of his shift on the date, Corrections Officer James Meyer was shown Polaroid 
pictures of Fernandez's cell (TR-82, 3). Jail staff believed these pictures might 
have been taken with a camera that had been taken from booking (TR-83). 
Later Meyer observed Fernandez place his arms into the tray slot of 
Madsen's cell and saw flashes. Believing that they were using the camera Meyer 
went to investigate 9TR-84). 
Madsen's cell was searched and the camera, three Polaroid photos of 
Madsen and a new roll of film were found in Madsen's pants (TR-86,8). 
Meyer locked Madsen down and searched Fernandez's cell. Meyer found 
hair oil, clothing belonging to another inmate, sharpened safety scissors, and 
excessive prescription medication. He confiscated these items (TR-89). 
As a result of these actions both inmates made threats. Fernandez 
threatened to do something stupid and hurt one of the officers (TR-89). He did not 
threaten to damage the jail (TR-89; 109). 
Madsen threatened to strangle Meyer and to flood the jail (TR-89-91). 
Meyer determined to move Fernandez to a different cell (TR-91). He 
examined the new cell including flushing the toilet (TR-92-93). Meyer did not 
check the plumbing in Madsen's room and did not know whether the toilet was 
working or not (TR-116). 
Approximately an hour and one half to an hour and forty-five minutes later 
Meyer was advised by Dispatch that water was coming off the tier where 
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Fernandez and Madsen were housed and flowing into the day room (TR-94). He 
returned to that area and found that only Fernandez and Madsen's cells were 
flooded and had full toilets (TR-94-6). 
Madsen's toilet had been clogged with some rags, pieces of underwear, a 
piece of a T-shirt and the orange part of a jump suit (TR-99). These items were 
admitted as Exhibit 3. Mr. Madsen's toilet was clogged with a laundry bag, 
admitted as Exhibit 2. 
The items could have been in the toilet for a lengthy period before they 
would have wadded enough or moved to create a clog (TR-148). In fact, the 
laundry bag that was not the type issued to him as a state inmate. It was a county 
inmate bag in Fernandez's possession when he checked his room shortly before 
the flooding (TR-114). 
No other inmates had access to the cells shortly before the flooding (TR-
172). 
Fernandez exercised his Constitutional right not to testify, Madsen did 
testify. Madsen testified that he did not flood it (TR-195). He did not put the 
items in his toilet and was unaware who had (TR-197). His toilet had been 
sluggish earlier (TR-196). He had tried to alert jail staff about the flooding 
pushing his intercom button and by waving (TR-204). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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1. Allowing the Defendants to be shackled and permitted uniformed 
armed guards in the courtroom violated Defendants state and federal rights to a 
fair trial. 
2. The trial court improperly denied Defendants for cause challenges to 
potential jurors. 
3. The trial court erred in denying the motion for mistrial when the 
State violated the Order not to refer to the Defendants status as punitive isolation 
on lockdown inmates. 
4. The trial court erred in refusing to allow Defendants a pre-sentence 
report and in ordering consecutive sentences. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: The trial court violated Fernandez's right to a fair trial by 
permitting excessive courtroom security. 
Defendants filed a Motion in Limine seeking to prohibit unnecessary 
courtroom security and to have the state detail and justify its proposed security 
plan(R-41,6). 
A hearing was held immediately prior to the trial at which time the state 
alleged Fernandez said he would escape if the opportunity presented itself and that 
a third inmate with an escape conviction was going to testify. The State contended 
that a screening apron on the front of counsel table would present the jury from 
seeing the shackles (TR-7-9). 
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It was explained that Fernandez had stated that he would escape from a 
work release program because he did not want to participate in work release (TR-
10). The Court was advised the third inmate would not be called in as witness 
(TR-10). 
The Court having determined that the Defendant's were wearing leg irons 
ruled, 
I can't see them. I can't see why the jury would be able to see'em 
and so the prejudice is virtually nonexistent. There exists a possibility that 
a juror might see them, but these are jurors that are gonna know these guys 
are in jail anyway. There're not gonna be shocked by, ah, catching a 
glimpse of leg irons, even if that should happen. So I'm gonna keep'em in 
leg irons. I think there's a need for protection here. 
The State did not disclose that armed, uniformed guards would be present 
in the Courtroom. The Court did not authorize the same. 
Following jury selection, counsel for Fernandez and Madsen objected to the 
presence of two armed uniformed officers in the courtroom, one seated directly 
behind the Defendants (TR-69). 
The Court then ruled that the guard's presence was necessary and 
appropriate (TR-69). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently ruled on the balance between the 
need for courtroom security and a Defendants constitutional rights to a fair trial. 
State v. Daniels, 2002 UT2,2002 Utah Lexis 4. 
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In Daniels, the trial court ordered the defendant, charged with co-defendant 
Kell in the capital prison murder of a third inmate, Blackmon, to be tried in the 
prison courtroom because 
(1) defendant participated in the planning and attack of Blackmon; (2) 
officers found a handcuff key in defendant's cell after the attack; (3) 
defendant made racially-related threats after the attack; (4) officers 
overheard banging and grinding noises, followed by a toilet flushing after 
the attack; (5) defendant threw urine on a prison control officer and said 
"This is for you...for testifying against me in court"; (6) defendant was 
involved in a prison riot in 1993, during which inmates destroyed property 
and removed a steel door from a shower room and used it as a battering ram 
to break down the door between the unit and the hallway around the control 
room; (7) excluding witnesses, at least twenty-three non-inmate citizens 
would be present at trial and (8) defendant Kell would likely testify at trial. 
In its order, the trail court described the three courtrooms in Sanpete 
County and explained that of the two located in Manti, only the smaller 
courtroom has adequate seating for fourteen jurors. The Department of 
Corrections presented a security plan for trying the case in this courtroom 
insisting that defendant be shackled, but proposing that a floor-length fabric 
be places around counsel table to conceal the shackles from the jury. This 
option would also have involved two plain-clothed security officers near 
defendant and others in the courtroom. Because of the size and security 
concerns presented by this courtroom, the Department of Corrections 
recommended that the trial be conducted inside the prison facility. 
Id. at paragraph 19, n.2. 
In assessing the propriety of the trial court's order on appeal, the court 
began by reviewing the basic federal constitutional law: 
The right to a fair trial is a fundamental constitutional right secured 
by the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Central to this right "is the principle that one 
accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined 
solely on the basis of the evidence introduces at trial, and not on grounds of 
.. .other circumstances not introduced as proof at trial." The presumption of 
innocence is a component of this guarantee of the right to a fair trial and has 
become a basic element of our criminal justice system, Even though the 
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trial judge has broad latitude to control and manage the proceedings to 
preserve the integrity of the trial process when a courtroom action or 
arrangement in challenged as inherently prejudicial, we consider whether 
the practice presents an unacceptable risk of bringing into play 
impermissible factors that might erode the presumption of innocence. If the 
challenged practice is not inherently prejudicial, the judgment of the trial 
court will be affirmed. If the practice is inherently prejudicial, we must 
then consider whether the prejudicial practice is outweighed by any 
competing essential state interests. 
Id. at paragraph 20 (citations omitted). 
As in Daniels, the jury in the instant case knew that Fernandez was a State 
inmate through the essential facts presented during the case. Regardless, 
shackling the Defendant and allowing armed uniformed law enforcement officers 
in the courtroom was prejudicial and eroded the presumption of innocence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this undermining of the 
presumption of innocence in State v. Young, 853 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1993). 
Although the Young decision condoned Defendants restraint, it did so only after 
an analysis if the specific fact situation of that case held that trial courts needed the 
need for security against the potential prejudice in each case Id at 350-1. 
The Daniels cases, Supra also supports the contention that the presence of 
the uniformed officers was prejudicial to Defendants and in a manner 
distinguishable from other indicia of his status as an inmate. 
The chief feature that distinguishes the use of identifiable security 
officers from courtroom practices we might find inherently prejudicial is 
the wider range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw from the 
officers' presence. While shackling and prison clothes are unmistakable 
indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large, 
the presence of guards at a defendant's trial need not be interpreted as a 
sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable. Jurors may just as easily 
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believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating 
from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do 
not erupt into violence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that jurors will not 
infer anything at all from the presence of the guards. If they are placed at 
some distance from the accused, security officers may well be perceived 
more as elements of an impressive drama than as reminders of the 
defendant's special status. Our society has become insured to the presence 
of armed guards in most public places; they are doubtless taken for granted 
so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official 
concern or alarm. See Hardee v. Kuhlman, 581 F. 2d 330, 332 (CA2 1978). 
To be sure, it is possible that the sight of a security force within the 
courtroom might under certain conditions "create the impression in the 
minds of the jury that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy." 
Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F. 2d 101, 108 (CA6 1973), cert denied, 416 
U.S. 959 (1974). However, "reason, principle, and common human 
experience." Williams, supra, at 504, counsel against presumption that any 
use of identifiable security guards in the courtroom is inherently 
prejudicial. In view of the variety of ways in which such guards can be 
deployed, we believe that a case-by-case approach is more appropriate. 
475 U.S. at 569 (Emphasis added). 
The Kennedy case cited by Holbrook further explains, 
A second category of cases involving the indicia of innocence pertains to an 
excessive number of guards in the courtroom during a criminal trial. The 
general rule derived from these decisions is that a defendant has a right to 
be tried in an atmosphere free of partiality created by the use of excessive 
guards except where special circumstances, which in the discretion of the 
trial judge, dictate added security precautions. One reason underlying this 
right is that guards seated around or next to the defendant during a jury trial 
are likely to crate the impression in the minds of the jury that the defendant 
is dangerous or untrustworthy. Also the placement of guards in relation to 
the defendant could materially interfere with his ability to consult with 
counsel. However, the use of guards for security purposes, when wisely 
employed, provides the best means for protecting a defendant's fair trial 
right and only in rare cases would greater security precautions be 
warranted. Since guards can be strategically places in the courtroom when 
more than normal security is needed and can be hidden in plainclothes, the 
jury never needs to be aware of the added protection so that no prejudice 
would adhere to the defendant. These cases provide an excellent point of 
comparison since they illustrate oftentimes-extreme situations, which were 
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adequately handled without the need for the much more drastic and 
prejudicial step of shackling. 
Kennedy, 487 F. 2d 108-109 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
Point II: The trial court erred in denying the for-cause challenge of 
potential jurors. 
During the jury selection process one juror indicated a close relationship 
with law enforcement officials in San Juan County. Ms. Bradford revealed that 
her son is an officer with the Blanding City Police but that she could be fair (TR-
35). Jason Jones reveled that he had a close working relationship with one of the 
States witnesses, working with him once or twice a month in the Search and 
Rescue for San Juan County (TR 44-5). Mr. Jones further had an attorney client 
relationship with Craig Halls, the Prosecutor. Mr. Halls had done some estate 
work for Mr. Jones (TR-46). Mr. Jones thinks a lot about his association with 
attorney Halls (TR-47). 
Counsel approached the bench for an off the record discussion of the jurors 
and to challenge for cause (TR-53). Subsequently the Court allowed Fernandez's 
attorney to question Mr. Jones directly. Mr. Jones admitted he would be more 
likely to believe Mr. Halls because he knew him and did not know Fernandez's 
attorney (TR-55). 
Both counsel reiterated their challenges made at sidebar and Judge 
Anderson passed the jury for cause (TR-57). After the panel had been selected the 
court and counsel made a record of the bench conference. Fernandez's attorney 
stated his motion to strike Juror Jones for cause (TR-66). Madsen's counsel noted 
12 
she had objected for cause to all the jurors who had indicated an affiliation or 
positive feeling for law enforcement (TR-67). The panel members objected to 
were identified as Daniel Brandt; Dennis Anderson; Loretta Bradford Stacy 
Cressler; and Jones. Madsen's attorney used two of her preemptory strikes to 
remove Bradford and Cressler. Fernandez's attorney used a peremptory challenge 
to remove Jones. (TR-67). (The court allowed each side four challenges to a 
sixteen-member panel. Defendants counsel exercised their challenges jointly (TR-
57)). 
Prior to State v. Menzies, 889 P. 2d 393 (Utah 1994), a criminal Defendant 
in Utah was entitled to a reversal whenever he was compelled to exercise a 
peremptory challenge to remove a panel member who should have been stricken 
for cause. Id. at 398, citing State v. Bishop, 753, P. 2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988). 
Since Menzies the Utah rule has been that the loss of peremptory challenge does 
not automatically create a loss of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. 
Rather the Defendant is required to show actual prejudice. He must show that a 
member of the jury was partial or incompetent. Menzies, at 398 citing Hopt v. 
Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887). 
The requirement that a Defendant prove or at least assert that he faced a 
partial or biased jury was upheld in State v. Carter, 888 P. 2d 629, 649 (Utah 
1995), holding such failure to be harmless error. However, the Supreme Court 
acting under its supervisory powers then went on to address its concern on trial 
courts passing jurors when legitimate concerns had been raised during voir dire 
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about their suitably. The Court stated "If a party raises legitimate questions as to a 
potential juror's beliefs, biases or physical ability to serve, the potential juror 
should be struck for cause, even when it would be legally erroneous to refuse/' Id 
at 650. Admittedly this admonition is directed specifically towards capital cases, 
but its rationale extends beyond. 
Further erosion of the Menzies standard is found in State v. Saunders, 992 
P. 2d 951 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court distinguished the fact situation 
from Menzies, holding that ruling "did not foreclose all considerations of 
erroneous for-cause rulings in determining whether there is sufficient prejudice in 
the circumstances of the case to require a reversal of a conviction. Id at 965. 
As in Saunders, the juror Jones expressed a belief that he was 
"uncomfortable" in deciding this case, at least to the extent that he favored the 
State's counsel for reasons that went beyond anything Defendants could do to 
cure. As in Saunders, given this attitude, the jurors should have been removed. 
As in Saunders, the trial courts refusal to strike the juror is reversible error. 
Point III: The trial erred in not granting a mistrial for the 
introduction of evidence of the Defendant's status as lock-
down inmates in violation of its in limine motion to 
exclude such testimony, 
Madsen joined in a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence of his status as a 
lock down prisoner at trial (R-34-40). Judge Anderson granted the Motion and 
Ordered the State not to inform the jurors that Defendants were kept in a punitive 
or high security area of the jail (TR-14, 15). 
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Flaunting that Order, Troy Butler, a jail officer, testified that the 
Defendants were in punitive isolation lockdown cells (TR-171). In response to 
objections taken by counsel for both Defendants the State indicated it had wanted 
Butler to testify to clarify that no one else had access to the flooded cells (TR-
174). After the court opinioned such testimony could have been obtained without 
reference to the punitive isolation (TR-175) counsel moved for mistrial (TR-173, 
176). The Court denied the motion holding such testimony not prejudicial in light 
of other derogatory testimony about Defendants (TR-182-3). 
Fernandez's contends that contrary to the Courts ruling, such evidence was 
unduly prejudicial and violated his rights to affair trial under case law and Utah 
Ruled Of Evidence. 
See e.g. State v. Saunders, 992, P. 2d 951 (Utah 1999), 
It is fundamental in our law that a person may be convicted 
criminally only for his acts, not his general character. That principle is 
violated if a conviction is based on an inference that conviction is justified 
because of the defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit bad 
acts. The admission of evidence of prior crimes may have such a powerful 
tendency to mislead the finder of facts as to subvert the constitutional 
principle that a defendant may be convicted only if guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of a specific crime charged. 
1999 Utah 59 at paragraph 15. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. In other 
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words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a 
non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court was clearly correct in its ruling to 
exclude the evidence and erred in denying a mistrial. Admission of the evidence 
of the punitive isolation and lockdown, enhanced by the shackles and excessive 
courtroom security, so likely prejudiced the jury it cannot be said the Defendants 
had a fair trial. The Court's ruling meets the "plainly wrong" standard of State v. 
DeCorso, 993 P. 2d 837 (Utah 1999). Defendants should be granted a new trial. 
Point IV: The trial erred in refusing to order a pre-sentence report. 
After Defendants were convicted, both counsel requested pre-sentence 
reports (TR-251-2). Counsel requested that the same be prepared and prior to 
sentencing due to difficulties in obtaining copies of the reports or convincing a 
court it has jurisdiction to correct errors in the reports (TR-251). Despite 
acknowledging the validity of these arguments, the court denied the request 
because he could not imagine anything a pre-sentence report would contain that 
would convince him to place Fernandez on probation (TR-252). Fernandez was 
sentenced to five years in the Utah State Prison to be served consecutively with the 
sentence he was already serving. However, the position ignores the other purpose 
a Pre-sentence report serves other than convincing a trial court to grant probation. 
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As the record in this case demonstrates (TR-251-2), and the cases 
interpreting Section 77-18-1 U.C.A. the Utah sentencing statute recognize, the 
Pre-sentence report is used by the Board of Pardons in setting release dates. As 
such, Defendants have a right to review and correct their reports. See e.g. State v. 
Jaeger, 973 P. 2d 404 (Utah 1999); Section 64-13-20 U.C.A. 
There is no legitimate criteria by which trial court should be enrolled to 
decide what Defendants should or shouldn't receive pre-sentence reports. This is 
especially true in the instant case where consecutive sentences have been imposed. 
The Board of Pardons needs to have an accurate report it issue fairness and 
accuracy in setting Fernandez's parole date. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should order a new fair trial. 
DATED this 18th day of March 2002. 
6/vg^A Jy 
WILLIAM L. SCHULXZ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Addendum A 
CRAIG C. HALLS #1317 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Phone: (435)587-2128 
Fax No. (435)587-3119 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San .Jupn County 
•*-& NOV G'3 200 : 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FELIX G. FERNANDEZ 
Defendant. 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 0117-97 
Case Judge: Lyle R. Anderson 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That the Defendant is forthwith remanded to the custody of the San Juan County Sheriff 
for transportation to the Utah State Prison and execution to the sentence given herein. 
There being no legal or other reason why sentence should not be imposed, and defendant having 
been convicted of the offense(s) of: 
Count 1: DAMAGING A JAIL, a third degree felony 
Defendant being now present in court and ready for sentence and represented by William 
L. Schultz, defendant is now adjudged guilty of the above offense(s) and is now sentenced to a 
term in the Utah State Prison not to exceed five years; such sentence is to run consecutively with 
sentence he is already serving. 
DATED this 9AU day of M?l^^^ > 2W\ 
LyleR^Anderson 
District Court Judge 
4^*7 
ATTES1 
^S^jui/icU \Xr?\fpti{^(, 
Clerk/ofithe Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered a true copy of the 
foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER OF COMMITMENT to William L. Schultz, Attorney 
for the defendant; Adult Probation Department at 1165 South Highway 191 #3, Moab, UT 
84532; and to the Department of Corrections, P.O. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020 
DATED this ^ day ct^r\n)jL/.srrJH!h) . ^nO/. 
Addendum B 
Utah Code Ann. §64-13-20 
(1) The department shall: 
(a) provide investigative and diagnostic services and prepare reports to: 
(i) assist the courts in sentencing; 
(ii) assist the Board of Pardons and Parole in its decisionmaking responsibilities regarding 
offenders; 
(iii) assist the department in managing offenders; and 
(iv) assure the professional and accountable management of the department; 
(b) establish standards for providing investigative and diagnostic services based on 
available resources, giving priority to felony cases; 
(c) employ staff for the purpose of conducting: 
(i) thorough presentence investigations of the social, physical, and mental conditions and 
backgrounds of offenders; 
(ii) examinations when required by the court or the Board of Pardons and Parole; and 
(iii) thorough diagnostic evaluations of offenders as the court finds necessary to 
supplement the presentence investigation report under Section 76-3-404. 
(2) The department may provide recommendations concerning appropriate measures to be 
taken regarding offenders. 
(3) (a) The presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports prepared by the 
department are protected as defined in Section 63-2-304 and after sentencing may not be 
released except by express court order or by rules made by the Department of Corrections, 
(b) The reports are intended only for use by: 
(i) the court in the sentencing process; 
(ii) the Board of Pardons and Parole in its decisionmaking responsibilities; and 
(iii) the department in the supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender. 
(4) Presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports shall be made available 
upon request to other correctional programs within the state if the offender who is the 
subject of the report has been committed or is being evaluated for commitment to the 
facility for treatment as a condition of probation or parole. 
(5) (a) The presentence investigation reports shall include a victim impact statement in all 
felony cases and in misdemeanor cases if the defendant caused bodily harm or death to the 
victim. 
(b) Victim impact statements shall: 
(i) identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; 
(iii) identify any physical, mental, or emotional injuries suffered by the victim as a result of 
the offense, and the seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result 
of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for mental health services initiated by the victim or the victim's 
family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim or 
the victim's family that the court requires. 
(6) If the victim is deceased; under a mental, physical, or legal disability; or otherwise 
unable to provide the information required under this section, the information may be 
obtained from the personal representative, guardian, or family members, as necessary. 
(7) The department shall employ staff necessary to pursue investigations of complaints 
from the public, staff, or offenders regarding the management of corrections programs. 
A person wno wiuruny and intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, 
or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of 
the third degree. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a plea in 
abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided in Title 77, 
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of any crime or 
offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the 
defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of 
class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the department is with 
the department. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court is 
vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards 
for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level of services shall be 
provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial 
Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to implement the 
supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the 
standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other criteria as they consider 
appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an impact report and 
submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to supervise the 
probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions or to conduct 
presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the 
department may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with 
department standards. 
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time 
for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the department or 
information from other sources about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement describing 
the effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. The victim impact statement 
shall: 
(i) identify all victims of the offense; 
(ii) include a specific statement of the recommended amount of complete restitution as 
defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompanied by a recommendation from the 
department regarding the payment of court-ordered restitution as defined in Subsection 76-
3-201(4) by the defendant; 
(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along with 
its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv) describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as a result 
of the offense; 
(v) identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the victim's 
family as a result of the offense; and 
(vi) contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the victim or 
the victim's family and any information required by Section 77-38a-203 that is relevant to 
the trial court's sentencing determination. 
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary 
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment 
of restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic 
evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, are protected and are not 
available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council or for use by the department. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's 
attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for 
review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence 
investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior 
to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may 
grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with 
the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court 
shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the 
time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or information 
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information shall be presented in open court on 
record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the 
defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation; 
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable; 
(iv) participate in available treatment programs; 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the 
department, after considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court 
finds most appropriate; 
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of electronic monitoring; 
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory 
service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest in accordance with 
Subsection 76-3-201(4); and 
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5,1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED 
certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's own expense if the defendant has 
not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on 
probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed in Subsection 
(8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as defined by Section 
76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with Subsection 77-27-
6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised probation and any 
extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(10). 
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under Subsection 
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as defined in 
Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant 
on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account 
receivable. 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and immediately transfer responsibility 
to collect the account to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, or upon its 
own motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his failure to pay 
should not be treated as contempt of court. 
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State Debt Collection, 
and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of 
supervised probation will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details 
on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after having been 
charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke probation does not 
constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is 
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation 
of probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term unless the 
probationer is exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance 
of an order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by 
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated 
the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized probation shall determine 
if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or 
extension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause why 
his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing and shall be 
served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by 
counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall 
present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based 
shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for 
good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present 
evidence. 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or that the entire probation term 
commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of the Division of 
Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of 
sentence, only after the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has 
certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment 
over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are 
classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access 
and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records 
Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for 
disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose 
the presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department for 
purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the subject's 
authorized representative; or 
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report or 
the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall 
include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the 
circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the 
crime on the victim or the victim's household. 
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the 
supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5. 
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home confinement, 
including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to the department in accordance 
with Subsection (16). 
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may order the 
defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring as 
described in this section until further order of the court. 
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law 
enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the defendant's compliance 
with the court's order may be monitored. 
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through electronic 
monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of 
Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the defendant and 
install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the 
department or the program provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through electronic monitoring 
only for those persons who have been determined to be indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this section either 
directly or by contract with a private provider. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-203 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all courts, the Department of Corrections, state prosecutors and 
criminal defense attorneys. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Presentence investigation reports shall be completed by order of the court as provided in 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 77-18-1 and 64-13-20. Presentence reports shall either be 
physically removed from the case file and kept in a separate storage area or retained in the 
case file in a sealed envelope marked "Controlled." 
(2) Full disclosure of the presentence investigation report shall be made to defense counsel, 
or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel, and to the prosecutor unless 
disclosure of the presentence report would jeopardize the life or safety of third parties. The 
presentence investigation report shall be made available to prosecutors and defense counsel 
or the defendant if the defendant is not represented by counsel at least three working days 
in advance of the scheduled sentencing date at the local office of the Department of 
Corrections or such other location as ordered by the court. The presentence report shall also 
be made available to prosecutors, defense counsel and the defendant at the court on the date 
of sentencing. In cases where a party or a party's counsel notifies the court clerk, in writing, 
that the presentence investigation report is the subject of an appeal, the clerk shall include 
the sealed presentence investigation report as part of the record. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 401 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by 
these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is not 
relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is 
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character 
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 
608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a 
non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
